Critically discuss the legal theory of Austin
$2.95
political science
presentation
published 28/02/2007
review : Completed
level : Advanced
requested 11 times
The existence of law is one thing, its merit or demerit is another. John Austin (1790-1859) defines the essence of positivism in this one sentence, generally cited as the standard exposition of the imperative theory of law, from his book: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832). A disciple of Jeremy Bentham who popularised the ideas, Austin was also inspired by political philosophers like Jean Bodin, David Hume or Thomas Hobbes arguing that the source of political authority has to be thought of as a sovereign who gives commands. According to Austin, law and morality must be strictly distinguished and law is merely a command given by a superior whom the society is in the habit of obedience. The law must then be enforced by a sanction. Law is valid if it is set by a sovereign, decreed, then posited. His ideas were recognised as a dominant force in English legal thinking in the nineteenth century and have been analysed by a series of writers known as the school of analytical jurisprudence. Austins legal theory has also been sharply criticised by other theorists, prominently H.L.A Hart in The Concept of Law (1961). Today, the Austinian basis has largely been rejected and the weaknesses of his theory are often better known than the theory itself. In this essay, I shall explain these critics and argue that the legal positivist theory of John Austin is fatally flawed.
Table of Contents
- The definition of positive law according to Austin excludes many areas of the law
- Austin's notions of the habit of obedience and sovereignty are deficient
