Did you choose to answer this question?

In this essay I will argue that it is possible that I had the free will to choose this question even in the face of hard-determinist opposition. I will reach this conclusion after outlining Clarence Darrow’s argument for determinism, suggesting that my decisions had no freedom in the choice of this question. I will then outline Kadri Vihvelin’s rebuttal to it, only to find a possible flaw in his argument. This will lead me to the conclusion that all I need to do is to demonstrate that there could be a world in which determinism and free will are compatible.

If this is the case then the onus is on the incompatibilist to disprove me.
Descartes argued that the one thing that I can be sure of is that “I think, therefore I am” (Descartes, 1647, 17). Essentially the one thing of which I can be certain is that I exist. This first principle rests on the fact that the proof of my existence depends upon my thinking. Since Descartes leaves no room for anything else existing then how can it be that this one thought was determined by the existence of anything else. If this thought was determined then what would be the point in consciousness?

[...] Did you choose to answer this question? In this essay I will argue that it is possible that I had the free will to choose this question even in the face of hard-determinist opposition. I will reach this conclusion after outlining Clarence Darrow’s argument for determinism, suggesting that my decisions had no freedom in the choice of this question. I will then outline Kadri Vihvelin’s rebuttal to it, only to find a possible flaw in his argument. This will lead me to the conclusion that all I need to do is to demonstrate that there could be a world in which determinism and free will are compatible. [...]

[...] Thus I did choose to answer this essay question. There is a problem with this argument. Here is what Vihvelin is arguing: (1) ‘We have free will only if we’ make choices that ‘make ourselves – that is, only if we cause ourselves to be the kind of persons we are.’ (2) We make choices. (3) Therefore we make ourselves. (4) Therefore we have free will. However, premise (2) presupposes that the ‘choices’ that we make are not predetermined. Essentially Vihvelin’s argument rests on the fact that we make free choices. [...]