Interdependence of norms in budgeting

Type :

Presentation

Pages :

7 pages

Format :

.doc

Published date :

09/25/2008

Category :

Economics & finance

Sub category :

Finance

Oboulo.com selection criteria

$ 14.95 Add to cart

Summary :

Introduction.
Political scientists.
Public administration researchers.
Executive leadership Versus Neutral competence.
Conclsion.

Abstract

Key (1940) contended that there was a lack of "attention from the basic budgeting problem (on the expenditure side), namely: On what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of Activity B?" (1137, emphasis in original) The literature of the era was concerned primarily with the technical aspects of budgeting, or in the case of public expenditures by socialist states (USSR, et al.), what might be called the "calculation problem" - in the absence of market forces, how might one determine how to ration scarce resources efficiently? In a mixed economy with a substantial public sector, the market is also of limited help in determining rational allocation of resources. Key (1940) points out: "Efforts to ascertain more precisely the relative 'values' of public services may be thought fruitless because of the influence of pressure groups in the determination of the allocation of funds. Each spending agency has its clientele, which it marshals for battle before budgetary and appropriating agencies." (1140) Of course, by the same token, no one set of interests is so overwhelmingly powerful as to be able to vote itself the whole of the treasury. Ultimately, Key maintains that both the neoclassical economists and political scientists have something to offer when seeking to determine the descriptive rules of public expenditure.