Should the U.S. encourage Japan’s rearmament?

In 1946, following the end of World War II and the defeat of the Axis countries, Japan was being occupied by the Americans. During this time, the Allied Powers—the United States, Great Britain, and China—drew up what became called the Potsdam Declaration, which held the terms for Japan’s unconditional surrender. This declaration included, among other things, a complete disarming of the Japanese army, so that the country could begin to work toward a “peacefully inclined and responsible government” (Wikipedia).

[...] In addition, should Japan begin to arm itself, especially in the area of nuclear weapons—which, although it is not being brought up as a major reason for amending the constitution, is inevitable—the effect would likely be an increase in military activity in both China and North Korea. The current situation with North Korea’s nuclear capabilities makes clear the fact that this would be undesirable. If the United States put their nuclear assets in Japan, and if Japan began building nuclear capabilities of its own, it is almost inevitable that China and North Korea would continue to do the same—creating the potential for an arms race reminiscent of the Cold War. [...]

[...] In the years after the U.S. occupation of Japan, however, Japan’s economy began to boom. Within the time period of one generation, Japan regained status as a great power—not through rebuilding its military, but by rebuilding its industries and reestablishing foreign trade (Calvocoressi, 2001). With no military to support and no foreign conquests to fund, Japan was able to focus on rebuilding its economy, causing their GNP to multiply twelve times. This is obviously one argument against rearming—the last decade has seen an economic slump for Japan, and spending billions of dollars to build up and aggressive military at this point would not likely be a boost to this situation. [...]