The problem of other minds: Empathy in the psychological development of children

Type :

Term papers

Pages :

5 pages

Format :

.doc

Published date :

07/29/2009

Category :

Social studies

Sub category :

Psychology

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Summary :

Introduction
The specifics of personal distress
Batson et al's demonstration
1. Strong correlation between empathy and sympathy
2. Evaluation of the individual's moral psychological development
Research into the cognitive development of children
Cross-disciplinary implications
Conclusions
References

Abstract

Discerning other minds is an issue rooted in the philosophical tradition with implications for ethical morality, epistemology, phenomenology, cognitive studies, psychology, and childhood development. While this list is by no means exhaustive, it suggests the extent to which an agent's attempt to conceptualize and to know another agent's mental process (ie, their thoughts, mood, etc.) is applicable to a cross-disciplinary interest in the humanities and the social sciences. Stueber (2008) traces the modern intellectual conception of empathy to the writings of psychologist Edward Tichener (1867-1927), and the translation of the German term "Einfühlung" (literally, "feeling into") into the English lexicon. Framing empathy as "feeling into" another implies more than an exercise in etymology, but locates the fundamental theoretical aspect of the conception: the agent's knowledge of other minds other than its own. In order to refine the development of the study of empathy in modern philosophy and psychology, it is necessary to consider the foundation of the Cartesian epistemological problem which presented itself to these early scholars of Einfühlung.

René Descartes (1596-1650) essentially conceived the world as existing outside of the individual agent's mind, and that it was therefore subject to skepticism. While thoughts and knowledge of the Self could be known innately through the individual's direct experience of their thinking-process (ie, known a priori), the external world of sense perception possesses no direct certainty of knowledge which can confirm or deny its existence and truth (ie, it is known a posteriori).